This page is on the Internet at

Readings for Ancient Greece 2 -- Unit 12, Pericles

Table of Contents

1  Ephialtes -- Wikipedia
2  Ephialtes --
3  Pericles -- Wikipedia
4  Link to Pericles biography in
  A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, William Smith, Ed.

5  Links to 5th century BC and Pericles material from Thomas R. Martin's An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander.  Pages include nuerous links to primary source texts from the Perseus Digital Library and to images.
6  Pericles' Acropolis

7  464 BC Sparta Earthquake
Areopagite Constitution


1  Ephialtes 

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ephialtes (Greek: Ἐφιάλτης, Ephialtēs) was an ancient Athenian politician and an early leader of the democratic movement there. In the late 460s BC, he oversaw reforms that diminished the power of the Areopagus, a traditional bastion of conservatism, and which are considered by many modern historians to mark the beginning of the "radical democracy" for which Athens would become famous. These powers included the scrutiny and control of office holders, and the judicial functions in state trials. He introduced pay for public officeholders, reduced the property qualifications for holding a public office, and created a new definition of citizenship.[1] Ephialtes, however, would not live to participate in this new form of government for long. In 461 BC, he was assassinated, probably at the instigation of resentful oligarchs, and the political leadership of Athens passed to his deputy, Pericles.


Early actions

Ephialtes first appears in the historical record as the strategos commanding an Athenian fleet in the Aegean sea in 465 BC.[2] Then, in 464 BC, an earthquake hit Sparta, causing a great deal of damage and indirectly resulting in the revolt of the helots. When the Spartans failed to remove the rebels from their base on Mount Ithome, in Messenia, they called for help from cities that were still part of the Hellenic League, an alliance formed in 481 BC against the Persians. The Spartans asked the Athenians for help due to the fact that Athenians had a reputation for being good at siege warfare. This spurred much debate among the Athenians as to what they must do. In August 463 BC, Ephialtes represented those who wished to refuse Sparta's request for military assistance in putting down a helot revolt.[3] Cimon, the most influential Athenian politician and general of the time, was strongly pro-Spartan and advocated sending assistance, arguing that Athenians "ought not to suffer Greece to be lamed, nor their own city to be deprived of her yoke-fellow."[4] Ephialtes, meanwhile, argued that Sparta and Athens were natural rivals, and that Athens should rejoice at Sparta's misfortune rather than help the other city recover. Cimon, however, was victorious in the debate, and set out for Sparta with 4,000 hoplites.[5] However, shortly after the Athenians arrived to help the “conservative and fundamentally xenophobic” Spartans, their assistance was turned down. Subsequently, harmony between Sparta and Athens was broken, and Cimon was ostracized for his misjudgment. The end of Cimon’s ascendancy resulted in the emergence of a more radical democratic movement led by Ephialtes.

Attack on the Areopagus council

At about this time, Ephialtes and his political allies began attacking the Areopagus council composed of former archons, which was a traditionally conservative force. According to Aristotle and some modern historians, Athens had, since about 470 BC, been governed under an informal "Areopagite constitution", under the leadership of Cimon.[6] The Areopagus had already been losing prestige ever since 486 BC, since when archons were selected by lot. Ephialtes accelerated this process by prosecuting certain members for maladministration.[7] Having thus weakened the prestige of the council, Ephialtes proposed and had passed in the popular assembly, a sweeping series of reforms which divided up the powers traditionally wielded by the Areopagus among the democratic council of the Boule, the ekklesia itself, and the popular courts. Ephialtes took away from the Areopagus their "additional powers, through which it had guardianship of the constitution." The Areopagus merely remained a high court, in control of judging charges of murder and some religious matters. Some historians have argued that Cimon and his hoplites were still in the Peloponnese at the time of this proposal,[8] while others have argued that the proposal followed his return.[9] Those who place the proposals during Cimon's absence suggest that he attempted to overturn them on his return, while those who believe he was present at the proposal believe that he opposed them in the initial debate. All agree that his resistance was doomed to failure by the fact that his hoplite force had just been rudely dismissed by the Spartans, an action which demolished the political standing of Cimon and other pro-Spartan Athenians.[10]

Death and legacy

The success of Ephialtes' reforms was rapidly followed by the ostracism of Cimon, which left Ephialtes and his faction firmly in control of the state, although the fully fledged Athenian democracy of later years was not yet fully established; Ephialtes' reforms appear to have been only the first step in the democratic party's programme.[11] Ephialtes, however, would not live to see the further development of this new form of government; In 461 BC, he was assassinated. The details of his assassination are unknown. However, there are several different theories to explain this event. The first source we have on Ephialtes himself and his death is Antiphon (5.68) written in 420 BC, which states that the identity of the murderer was unknown. “Thus those who murdered Ephialtes, one of your citizens, have never been discovered to this day, and if someone expected his associates to conjecture who were his [Ephialtes'] murderers, and if not, to be implicated in the murder, it would not have been fair to the associates. In addition, the murderers of Ephialtes did not desire to hide the body so there would be no danger of betraying the deed.” However 90 years later, Aristotle, in his Constitution of Athens 25.4, states that Aristodikos of Tanagra was the culprit. As the years progressed, more theories were established. A third idea is that Aristodikos of Tanagra was part of an oligarchic plot; his political ally Pericles would go on to complete the governmental transformation and lead Athens for several decades.[12] Had Ephialtes been murdered by somebody outside the radical faction, scholar Robert W. Wallace reasons, the radicals would have made him a martyr and led a crusade to find the perpetrator. This didn't happen, so the murderer likely came from within Ephialtes' own faction. [13]

Literary references

The assassination of Ephialtes, and a subsequent murder investigation to find the men behind the plot, is the subject of an historical mystery novel, The Pericles Commission, by Gary Corby.


  1. Morris & Raaflaaub, Democracy 2500: Questions and Challenges
  2. "Ephialtes (4)," from The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, ed.
  3. Unless otherwise noted, all details of this conflict are drawn from Plutarch, He stated that they must “let Sparta’s pride be trampled underfoot.” (Plutrach’s Cimon 16.8; Scott-Kilvert 1960) Cimon 16.8.
  4. Plutarch, Cimon 16.8; Plutarch is quoting here from Ion of Chios.
  5. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 72
  6. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 64-5. See also Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians, 23
  7. Unless otherwise noted, all details of this campaign are drawn from Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians, 25
  8. Hignett, History of the Athenian Constitution, 341
  9. De Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, 179
  10. Kagan, Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 73-74
  11. Hignett, History of the Athenian Constitution, 217-18
  12. Plutarch, Pericles, 10.6-7
  13. Robert W. Wallace, "Ephialtes and the Areopagus," Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies XV (1974), pg. 269.


2  Ephialtes -- Stoa:Demos
(This Internet page has many additional Internet links.)

  Christopher W. Blackwell, edition of January 27, 2003

· Summary ·

Ephialtes was a democratic reformer in Athens in the early years of the 5th century BCE. Evidence about him is scanty, although we can learn a certain amoung from Plutarch’s biography of Cimon, who was Ephialtes’ main political opponent (Plut. Cim.). Around 462 BCE, Ephialtes brought about changes to the Court of the Areopagus. He sponsored laws and decrees that removed many powers from the Areopagus and gave them to the People’s Court or the Assembly. Because the Areopagus, consisting of former archons serving on the body for life, was the least democratic of Athens’ political institutions, the reforms of Ephialtes can be said to have completed Athens’ transformation into a radical democracy.

· Introduction: ·

Writing in the 4th century BCE, the orator Isocrates offers this critical description of Athenian politics in the early 5th century BCE: “…the city waxed powerful and seized the empire of the Hellenes, and our fathers, growing more self-assured than was appropriate for them, began to look with disfavor on those good men and true ( τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ) who had made Athens great, envying them their power, and to crave instead men who were base-born and full of insolence ( πονηρῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καὶ μεστῶν θρασύτητος ἐπεθύμησαν ), thinking that by their bravado and contentiousness they would be able to preserve Democracy ( διαφυλάττειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν )” (Isoc. 15.316-317). Aristotle describes the early history of the Athenian democracy in terms of a struggle between two factions in Athens, that of the rich, and that of the People, with individual Athenians leading each party. After the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons, which ended c.510 BCE (source: OCD3), Isagoras took the side of the rich, and Cleisthenes took the side of the People, then Miltiades and Xanthippus, then Aristides and Themistocles, and then Cimon led the rich, while Ephialtes took the side of the People (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 28.2). The most significant event in the political development of Athenian government in the time of Cimon and Ephialtes, according to Aristotle, was when Ephialtes “put down the Council of the Areopagus” ( καταλύσας τὴν Ἀρεοπαγῖτιν βουλήν ) (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 41.1). Because of the changes to the power and authority of the Council of the Areopagus, “it came about that the constitution became still more democratic” (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27.1).

· Ephialtes’ Family and Character ·

Plutarch did not write a biography of Ephialtes, unfortunately, and so we know many fewer details about him than about other prominent Athenians. Interested readers should read the article on Cimon, Ephialtes’ principle political rival, to fill out the picture of Athenian politics in the first half of the 5th century BCE.

Ephialtes was the son of Sophonides (Diod. 11.77.6). Aelian includes him in a list of important public figures who were not rich (Ael. VH 2.43; Ael. VH 11.9), which we might contrast to the famous wealth of his political rival Cimon (Hdt. 6.136.3; Plut. Cim. 4.4; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27.2-3; Plut. Cim. 10.1-2; Dem. 13.29). Aelian also calls Ephialtes a “philosopher”, but what that is supposed to mean is not clear (Ael. VH 3.17).

Ephialtes seems to have held the position of strategos ( στρατηγός ), or General, at Athens, since we hear of him commanding an Athenian fleet in the Aegean, shortly after Cimon’s victories over Persia in 467 (Plut. Cim. 13.5; source for date, OCD3).

Apart from these few details, most of what we know about Ephialtes has to do with is greatest political triumph, the reform of the Council of the Areopagus at Athens. Diodorus, who is critical of the reform, summarizes the event and adds a “moral,” saying that Ephialtes “persuaded the Assembly to vote to curtail the power of the Council of the Areopagus and to destroy the renowned customs which their fathers had followed. Nevertheless, he did not escape the punishment for attempting such lawlessness, but he was done to death by night and none ever knew how he lost his life” (Diod. 11.77.6).

· The Areopagus Before the Reforms. ·

The Council of the Areopagus (also called the Court of the Areopagus), its history, and its role in the Athenian democracy is described at length, with links to the ancient evidence, elsewhere (see Areopagus). What follows is a brief summary of its powers before Ephialtes’ reforms, to help put those reforms in context.

The Court of the Areopagus was an ancient institution. It features in the mythological history of Athens, as portrayed in Aeschylus’ tragedy Eumenides, in which the goddess Athene puts the Eumenides, or Furies, on trial on this Hill of the Areopagus at Athens (Aesch. Eum.). Even under the democratic government of the 4th century BCE, after much of the power of government was in the hands of the People, this mythology could be invoked for rhetorical effect in the classical period, as when a certain Autocles arguing that a certain Mixidemides should stand trial before the Court of the Areopagus: “If the awful goddesses [i.e. the Furies— CWB] were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides?” (Aristot. Rh. 1398b 25). The orator Demosthenes praises the institution and its history: “Concerning that Court of the Areopagus I could relate a greater number of noble stories, in part traditional and legendary, in part certified by our own personal testimony, than could be told of any other tribunal. It is worth your while to listen to one or two of them by way of illustration. First, then, in ancient times, as we are told by tradition, in this court alone the gods condescended both to render and to demand satisfaction for homicide, and to sit in judgement upon contending litigants—Poseidon, according to the legend, deigning to demand justice from Ares on behalf of his son Halirrothius, and the twelve gods to adjudicate between the Eumenides and Orestes. These are ancient stories; let us pass to a later date. This is the only tribunal which no despot, no oligarchy, no democracy, has ever dared to deprive of its jurisdiction in cases of murder, all men agreeing that in such cases no jurisprudence of their own devising could be more effective than that which has been devised in this court” (Dem. 23.65-66). Isocrates, another 4th century orator, claims that, once upon a time, the court had authority over the day to day behavior of the citizens: “For our forefathers placed such strong emphasis upon sobriety that they put the supervision of decorum in charge of the Council of the Areopagus—a body which was composed exclusively of men who were of noble birth and had exemplified in their lives exceptional virtue and sobriety, and which, therefore, naturally excelled all the other councils of Hellas” (Isoc. 7.37). Aristotle says that in the time of Draco, the legendary first lawgiver of Athens, “The Council of the Areopagus was guardian of the laws, and kept a watch on the magistrates to make them govern in accordance with the laws. A person unjustly treated might lay a complaint before the Council of the Arepagites [the members of the Court of the Areopagus— CWB], stating the law in contravention of which he was treated unjustly” (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 4.4).

The Court of the Areopagus was an aristocratic institution, composed of “men who were of noble birth” ( οῖς καλῶς γεγονόσι ) (Isoc. 7.37). It was composed of men who had held the office of archon (Plut. Sol. 19.1; Plut. Per. 9.3). Members of the Court of the Areopagus, the “Areopagites” ( Ἀρεοπαγίται ) held office for life, not only in pre-democratic Athens but also in the latter half of the 4th century (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 3.6). According to Aristotle, before the time of the lawgiver Solon—the middle of the 6th century BCE (source: OCD3)—the Court of the Areopagus itself chose the men who would be archons, and thus future members of the Areopagus (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 8.1). “Selection of archons was by wealth and birth” ( γὰρ αἵρεσις τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀριστίνδην καὶ πλουτίνδην ἦν ) (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 3.6), and so the Court of the Areopagus preserved itself as a body of the aristocrats of Athens.

Solon changed method by which Athenians became archons—forty candidates were elected, and from these forty, nine archons were picked by lot (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 8.1). Under the laws of Solon, the Court of the Areopagus retained its role as “overseer of the constitution” ( ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας ); it could punish citizens, fine them, and spend money itself without answering to any other governing body; and it oversaw cases impeachment (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 8.4). Aristotle describes the government of Athens under Solon as a blend of elements—the courts were democratic, the elected archons were aristocratic, and the Court of the Areopagus was oligarchic (Aristot. Pol. 1273b).

The Court of the Areopagus seems to have enjoyed a return to its former glory immediately after the Persian Wars. Aristotle tells the story of how, during the chaos of the Persian invasion in 480 BCE, the Council of the Areopagus took a leading role in organizing, and financing, the evacuation of all Athenians to Salamis and the Peloponnese, which raised the body’s status considerably (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 23.1). He goes on to say that the Council of the Areopagus enjoyed preeminence in Athens for almost two decades, until the time when Conon was archon, and Ephialtes brought about his reforms in 462 BCE (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.1; source for date: OCD3).

The ancient sources are not consistent regarding who was responsible for the reform of the Areopagus. Aristotle’s Constitution of the Athenians, for example, mentions Ephialtes alone at one point (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.1), Ephialtes and Themistocles elsewhere (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.3-4), and Pericles elsewhere (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27.1). Plutarch also gives credit to Pericles (Plut. Per. 9.3), but his description of events helps straighten out the confusion and point to Ephialtes as the man responsible for the reforms themselves: “For this reason all the more did Pericles, strong in the affections of the people, lead a successful party against the Council of the Areopagus. Not only was the Council robbed of most of its jurisdiction by Ephialtes, but Cimon also, on the charge of being a lover of Sparta and a hater of the people, was ostracized” (Plut. Per. 9.4 [emphasis added— CWB]). Elsewhere in his biography of Pericles, Plutarch refers to Ephialtes as the one “who broke down the power of the Council of the Areopagus” (Plut. Per. 7.6). According to Plutarch, then, Pericles may have been an important influence behind the events, but it was Ephialtes who actually brought about the reforms (see also Aristot. Pol. 1274a, which seems to agree with Plutarch’s version, and Diod. 11.77.6, which mentions Ephialtes only).

· Political Background to Ephialtes’ Reforms: Cimon and Themistocles ·

In the years following the Persian Wars, which ended in 479 BCE (source: OCD3), the principle advocate of a less democratic, more restricted, government was Cimon, the son of Miltiades (Plut. Cim. 4.1; Plut. Cim. 10.7). Themistocles was a leading advocate of democratic reforms, and Ephialtes seems to have been his successor in this role, after Themistocles was ostracized in 472 BCE (Plut. Them. 22.2; Plut. Cim. 10.6-8; source for date: OCD3).

In the years before Ephialtes enacted his reforms, both Cimon and Themistocles stood trial before the Court of the Areopagus, and these trials provide an interesting background to Ephialtes’ reforms.

By 467 BCE, while the Persians had been mostly driven from the Aegean sea, they remained in the Chersonese, a peninsula in the northern Aegean, and allied themselves with some of the people of Thrace; the Athenians dispatched Cimon to wage war against them (Plut. Cim. 14.1; source for date: OCD3). Cimon won a victory in Thrace, which would have allowed him, had he wished to, to invade Macedonia. When he failed to do this, he was brought to trial in Athens, accused of accepting bribes to leave Macedonia alone; one of the prosecutors at his trial was Pericles (Plut. Cim. 14.2-3). Cimon spoke well in his own defense (Plut. Cim. 14.3) and was acquitted, but this trial, at least as Plutarch narrates Cimon’s career, marked the beginning of a period of confrontation between him and the democratic reformers (Plut. Cim. 15.1-2; Plut. Cim. 10.7).

Themistocles was himself a member of the Court of the Areopagus, but was ostracized at the end of the 470s BCE (Plut. Them. 22.1; Thuc. 1.135). While he was in exile, the Court of the Areopagus tried him for treason—the charge was “Medism,” or conspiring with Persia—and condemned him to death, although he was absent (Thuc. 1.138; Plut. Them. 22.1; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.3). According to Aristotle, Themistocles encouraged Ephialtes to limit the powers of the Court of the Areopagus in order to forestall his own prosecution (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.3-4). This directly contradicts all other sources, who make it clear that Themistocles was not, in fact, in Athens at the time of his trial (Thuc. 1.135-138; Plut. Them. 22.1), but it might suggest that the trial of Themistocles, a famous advocate of democratic reform, influenced Ephialtes.Cause and effect in history, ancient or modern, are difficult to establish, but we can say this: when Ephialtes enacted his reforms that limited the powers of the Court of the Areopagus, thus making Athens more democratic (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 41.1; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27.1; Plut. Per. 7.6), that court had recently acquitted a famous opponent of democracy and had condemned a famous proponent of democracy.

In the year 462, Cimon led an Athenian army to the Peloponnese to help Sparta put down a rebellion, a mission that Ephialtes had opposed (Plut. Cim. 16.8). Ephialtes seems to have taken advantage of his absence to enact democratic reforms, especially a reform in the powers and authority of the Court of the Areopagus (Plut. Cim. 15.1-2; for a full discussion of the circumstances of Cimon’s absence, and the timing of Ephialtes’ reforms, see the article on Cimon). Upon Cimon’s return, he was ostracized for ten years (Plut. Cim. 17.2; Plut. Per. 9.4).

· Political Background to Ephialtes’ Reforms: the People ·

According to Aristotle, Ephialtes brought about a reform of the Court of the Areopagus by denouncing the Court before the Council ( τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων ) and the Assembly ( ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ) (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.4). So the reform was not, finally, the work of Ephialtes alone, but an act of legislation by two of the more democratic institutions in Athens. Aristotle connects this event to a newfound feeling of power among the common people of Athens following the Persian Wars, when the less wealthy citizens by serving in the navy had saved the city. He makes the connection between naval victories and the reform of the Court of the Areopagus explicitly in his Politics (Aristot. Pol. 1274a), and the Constitution of the Athenians strongly suggests the connection as well: “For he took away some of the functions of the Areopagus, and he urged the state very strongly in the direction of naval power, which resulted in emboldening the multitude, who brought all the government more into their own hands.” (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27.1; note that “he” in this quotation is Pericles, but as we have seen this work attributes these reforms to Ephialtes and Pericles, as does the Politics [see Aristot. Pol. 1274a— CWB]).

By 462 BCE, when Ephialtes made his reforms, the archons (the future members of the Court of the Areopagus) were chosen by lot, not by vote (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22.5). It is possible that this change made the institution seem less prestigious, and thus worthy of holding fewer powers [This interesting suggestion is from P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1993)— CWB].

· The Reforms Themselves ·

By means of Ephialtes’ reforms, according to Aristotle, “the Council of the Areopagus was deprived of the superintendence of affairs. After this there came about an increased relaxation of the constitution” (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 26.1). A fragment from Philochorus, who was a historian writing in the 3rd century BCE, offers a little more detail. In his description of the nomophylakes, or “guardians of the laws” ( νομοφύλακες ), he says: “There were seven of them, and they were established when Ephialtes left to the Council of the Areopagus only those cases pertaining to the body” ( ἑπτὰ δὲ ἦσαν καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς Φιλόχορος, ὅτε Ἐφιάλτης μόνα κατέλιπε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος ) (Philoch. fr. 64).

To understand what Aristotle means by “deprived of superintendence of affairs”, or what Philochorus means by “only those cases pertaining to the body” we can only look at comments in the sources about the Court of the Areopagus’ role after Ephialtes’ reforms. Aristotle, describing the Court of the Areopagus and its functions in the middle of the 4th century BCE (over a century after Ephialtes’ reforms), says that this court had authority over trials of murder, wounding, death by poison, and arson, but that other similar crimes—involuntary manslaughter, murder of slaves or foreigners, accidental killings, or killings in self-defense—come before other courts, the Court of the Palladium or the Court of the Delphinium (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 57.3). A law quoted in a speech by Demosthenes agrees (Dem. 23.22); but it is important to remember that laws quoted in speeches may have been added to the manuscript later, sometime centuries later.

If Ephialtes’ reforms took many crimes out of the jurisdiction of the Court of the Areopagus and assigned them to other courts, with juries of citizens, then there would have been a greater need for citizens to serve on juries. And, in fact, several of the accounts of Ephialtes and Pericles reforming the Court of the Areopagus also the institution of pay for jury service, an innovation that may have aimed at meeting this new need. Aristotle relates the two reforms very closely, and relates them both to an increasingly democratic government: “Ephialtes and Pericles docked the power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and in this manner finally the successive leaders of the people led them on by growing stages to the present democracy” (Aristot. Pol. 1274a; also Plut. Per. 9.3; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 27.2-3).

The evidence from the 4th century BCE shows the Court of the Areopagus performing other functions, but it is impossible to say whether those were left by Ephialtes, or they were added sometime after his reforms. At the end of the 5th century BCE, after Athens had lost the Peloponnesian War, the city was governed for a short time by the so-called Thirty Tyrants, whose first order of business was to undo Ephialtes’ reforms (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 35.2). After the Thirty Tyrants were, themselves, overthrown, the city returned to democratic rule (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 36-41). It is possible that the Court of the Areopagus was given new authority over specific matters at this time. For example, in the 4th century the court had authority over people accused of digging up sacred olive trees, the penalty for which death or exile (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 60.2; Lys. 7.22). We also find them investigating matters pertaining to piety, but with limited powers of punishment (Dem. 59.80).

Ephialtes’ reforms took authority away from the Court of the Areopagus and put it into the hands of the people, but the court did retain its status as a time-honored and exalted institution. At the beginning of the 4th century, Lysias could say to the Athenians, “you have, in the council of the Areopagus, the finest model in Greece: a court so superior to others that even the men convicted in it admit that its judgements are just” (Lys. 1.12). Half a century later, Aeschines offers this praise for the body: “Take the example of the Council of the Areopagus, the most scrupulous tribunal in the city. I myself have before now seen many men convicted before this tribunal, though they spoke most eloquently, and presented witnesses; and I know that before now certain men have won their case, although they spoke most feebly, and although no witnesses testified for them. For it is not on the strength of the pleading alone, nor of the testimony alone, that the members of the court give their verdict, but on the strength of their own knowledge and their own investigations. And this is the reason why that tribunal maintains its high repute in the city.” ( χρήσασθε δὴ παραδείγματι τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, τῷ ἀκριβεστάτῳ συνεδρίῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. πολλοὺς γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε τεθεώρηκα ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ τούτῳ εὖ πάνυ εἰπόντας καὶ μάρτυρας πορισαμένους ἁλόντας· ἤδη δέ τινας κακῶς πάνυ διαλεχθέντας καὶ πρᾶγμα ἀμάρτυρον ἔχοντας οἶδα νικήσαντας. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου μόνον οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τῶν μαρτυριῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ συνίσασι καὶ ἐξητάκασι, τὴν ψῆφον φέρουσι. τοιγάρτοι διατελεῖ τοῦτο τὸ συνέδριον εὐδοκιμοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ) (Aeschin. 1.92).

· The Death of Ephialtes ·

Aristotle says that, shortly after reforming the Court of the Areopagus, Ephialtes was kidnapped and murdered by Aristodicus of Tanagra (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 25.2; also Plut. Per. 10.7, who cites Aristotle as his source). Other sources do not think that the case of Ephialtes’ murder is so easily solved, however. Diodorus, highly critical of Ephialtes’ democratic reforms, describes the man’s end in moral terms: “Ephialtes the son of Sophonides, who, being a popular leader, had provoked the masses to anger against the Areopagites, persuaded the Assembly to vote to curtail the power of the Council of the Areopagus and to destroy the renowned customs which their fathers had followed. Nevertheless, he did not escape the punishment for attempting such lawlessness, but he was done to death by night and none ever knew how he lost his life” (Diod. 11.77.6). Plutarch says that the historian Idomeneus—who lived in the late 4th and early 3rd centuries BCE (source: OCD3)—actually accused Pericles of murdering Ephialtes (Plut. Per. 10.6). In his own century, the 5th century BCE, Ephialtes’ murders were not known (Antiph. 5.68).

Plutarch, whose judgement of Ephialtes’ reforms and their effect on the people of Athens is highly critical (Plut. Per. 7.6), nevertheless names the reformer as one of the founders of Athens’ prosperity and power in the 5th century (Plut. Per. 16.2).

· Secondary Works Cited ·

  1. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth edd., The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd Edition (Oxford, 1996) [OCD3].
  2. P.J. Rhodes, Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1993).

Christopher W. Blackwell, “Ephialtes,” in C.W. Blackwell, ed., Dēmos: Classical Athenian Democracy (A. Mahoney and
R. Scaife, edd., The Stoa: a consortium for electronic publication in the humanities []) edition of January 27,
2003.  Contact:

© January 27, 2003, Christopher W. Blackwell. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.
Dēmos · Classical Athenian Democracy · a Stoa Publication

3  Pericles

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

                            Pio-Clementino Inv269 n2.jpg
Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription "Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian". Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original from c. 430 BC
Born c. 495 BC   Cholargos
Died 429 BC   Athens
Allegiance Athens
Rank General (Strategos)
Battles/wars Battle in Sicyon and Acarnania (454 BC)
Second Sacred War (448 BC)
Expulsion of barbarians from Gallipoli (447 BC)
Samian War (440 BC)
Siege of Byzantium (438 BC)
Peloponnesian War (431–429 BC)

Pericles (/ˈpɛrɪklz/; Greek: Περικλῆς Periklēs, pronounced [pe.ri.klɛ̂ːs] in Classical Attic; c. 495 – 429 BC) was arguably the most prominent and influential Greek statesman, orator and general of Athens during the Golden Age— specifically the time between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. He was descended, through his mother, from the powerful and historically influential Alcmaeonid family.

Pericles had such a profound influence on Athenian society that Thucydides, a contemporary historian, acclaimed him as "the first citizen of Athens".[1] Pericles turned the Delian League into an Athenian empire, and led his countrymen during the first two years of the Peloponnesian War. The period during which he led Athens, roughly from 461 to 429 BC, is sometimes known as the "Age of Pericles", though the period thus denoted can include times as early as the Persian Wars, or as late as the next century.

Pericles promoted the arts and literature; it is principally through his efforts that Athens holds the reputation of being the educational and cultural center of the ancient Greek world. He started an ambitious project that generated most of the surviving structures on the Acropolis (including the Parthenon). This project beautified and protected the city, exhibited its glory, and gave work to the people.[2] Pericles also fostered Athenian democracy to such an extent that critics call him a populist.[3][4]


Early years

Pericles was born c. 495 BC, in the deme of Cholargos just north of Athens.α[›] He was the son of the politician Xanthippus, who, though ostracized in 485–484 BC, returned to Athens to command the Athenian contingent in the Greek victory at Mycale just five years later. Pericles' mother, Agariste, a member of the powerful and controversial noble family of the Alcmaeonidae, and her familial connections played a crucial role in kickstarting Xanthippus' political career. Agariste was the great-granddaughter of the tyrant of Sicyon, Cleisthenes, and the niece of the Athenian reformer Cleisthenes.β[›][6]

According to Herodotus and Plutarch, Agariste dreamed, a few nights before Pericles' birth, that she had borne a lion. Interestingly, legends say that Philip II of Macedon had a similar dream before the birth of his son, Alexander the Great.[7][8] One interpretation of the dream treats the lion as a traditional symbol of greatness, but the story may also allude to the unusually large size of Pericles' skull, which became a popular target of contemporary comedians (who called him "Squill-head", after the Squill or Sea-Onion).[8][9] (Although Plutarch claims that this deformity was the reason that Pericles was always depicted wearing a helmet, this is not the case; the helmet was actually the symbol of his official rank as strategos (general).[10]

Pericles belonged to the tribe of Acamantis (Ἀκαμαντὶς φυλή). His early years were quiet; the introverted young Pericles avoided public appearances, instead preferring to devote his time to his studies.[11]

His family's nobility and wealth allowed him to fully pursue his inclination toward education. He learned music from the masters of the time (Damon or Pythocleides could have been his teacher)[12][13] and he is considered to have been the first politician to attribute importance to philosophy.[11] He enjoyed the company of the philosophers Protagoras, Zeno of Elea, and Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras, in particular, became a close friend and influenced him greatly.[12][14]

Pericles' manner of thought and rhetorical charisma may have been in part products of Anaxagoras' emphasis on emotional calm in the face of trouble and skepticism about divine phenomena.[6] His proverbial calmness and self-control are also often regarded as products of Anaxagoras' influence.[15]

Political career until 431 BC

Entering politics

In the spring of 472 BC, Pericles presented The Persians of Aeschylus at the Greater Dionysia as a liturgy, demonstrating that he was one of the wealthier men of Athens.[16] Simon Hornblower has argued that Pericles' selection of this play, which presents a nostalgic picture of Themistocles' famous victory at Salamis, shows that the young politician was supporting Themistocles against his political opponent Cimon, whose faction succeeded in having Themistocles ostracized shortly afterwards.[17]

Plutarch says that Pericles stood first among the Athenians for forty years.[18] If this was so, Pericles must have taken up a position of leadership by the early 460s BC- in his early or mid-thirties. Throughout these years he endeavored to protect his privacy and to present himself as a model for his fellow citizens. For example, he would often avoid banquets, trying to be frugal.[19][20]

In 463 BC, Pericles was the leading prosecutor of Cimon, the leader of the conservative faction who was accused of neglecting Athens' vital interests in Macedon.[21] Although Cimon was acquitted, this confrontation proved that Pericles' major political opponent was vulnerable.[22]

Ostracizing Cimon

Around 461 BC, the leadership of the democratic party decided it was time to take aim at the Areopagus, a traditional council controlled by the Athenian aristocracy, which had once been the most powerful body in the state.[23] The leader of the party and mentor of Pericles, Ephialtes, proposed a reduction of the Areopagus' powers. The Ecclesia (the Athenian Assembly) adopted Ephialtes' proposal without opposition.[20] This reform signaled the beginning of a new era of "radical democracy".[23]

The democratic party gradually became dominant in Athenian politics, and Pericles seemed willing to follow a populist policy in order to cajole the public. According to Aristotle, Pericles' stance can be explained by the fact that his principal political opponent, Cimon, was both rich and generous, and was able to gain public favor by lavishly handing out portions of his sizable personal fortune.[21] The historian Loren J. Samons II argues, however, that Pericles had enough resources to make a political mark by private means, had he so chosen.[24]

In 461 BC, Pericles achieved the political elimination of this opponent using ostracism. The accusation was that Cimon betrayed his city by aiding Sparta.[25]

After Cimon's ostracism, Pericles continued to promote a populist social policy.[20] He first proposed a decree that permitted the poor to watch theatrical plays without paying, with the state covering the cost of their admission. With other decrees he lowered the property requirement for the archonship in 458–457 BC and bestowed generous wages on all citizens who served as jurymen in the Heliaia (the supreme court of Athens) some time just after 454 BC.[26] His most controversial measure, however, was a law of 451 BC limiting Athenian citizenship to those of Athenian parentage on both sides.[27]

Such measures impelled Pericles' critics to hold him responsible for the gradual degeneration of the Athenian democracy. Constantine Paparrigopoulos, a major modern Greek historian, argues that Pericles sought for the expansion and stabilization of all democratic institutions.[29] Hence, he enacted legislation granting the lower classes access to the political system and the public offices, from which they had previously been barred.[30]

According to Samons, Pericles believed that it was necessary to raise the demos, in which he saw an untapped source of Athenian power and the crucial element of Athenian military dominance.[31] (The fleet, backbone of Athenian power since the days of Themistocles, was manned almost entirely by members of the lower classes.[32])

Cimon, on the other hand, apparently believed that no further free space for democratic evolution existed. He was certain that democracy had reached its peak and Pericles' reforms were leading to the stalemate of populism. According to Paparrigopoulos, history vindicated Cimon, because Athens, after Pericles' death, sank into the abyss of political turmoil and demagogy. Paparrigopoulos maintains that an unprecedented regression descended upon the city, whose glory perished as a result of Pericles' populist policies.[29]

According to another historian, Justin Daniel King, radical democracy benefited people individually, but harmed the state.[33] On the other hand, Donald Kagan asserts that the democratic measures Pericles put into effect provided the basis for an unassailable political strength.[34] After all, Cimon finally accepted the new democracy and did not oppose the citizenship law, after he returned from exile in 451 BC.[35]

Leading Athens

Ephialtes' murder in 461 BC paved the way for Pericles to consolidate his authority.δ[›] Without opposition after the expulsion of Cimon, the unchallengeable leader of the democratic party became the unchallengeable ruler of Athens. He remained in power until his death in 429 BC.

First Peloponnesian War

Phidias Showing the Frieze of the Parthenon to Pericles, Aspasia, Alcibiades and friends, by Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema, 1868, Birmingham Museum & Art Gallery.

Pericles made his first military excursions during the First Peloponnesian War, which was caused in part by Athens' alliance with Megara and Argos and the subsequent reaction of Sparta. In 454 BC he attacked Sicyon and Acarnania.[36] He then unsuccessfully tried to conquer Oeniadea on the Corinthian gulf, before returning to Athens.[37] In 451 BC, Cimon returned from exile and negotiated a five years' truce with Sparta after a proposal of Pericles, an event which indicates a shift in Pericles' political strategy.[38] Pericles may have realized the importance of Cimon's contribution during the ongoing conflicts against the Peloponnesians and the Persians. Anthony J. Podlecki argues, however, that Pericles' alleged change of position was invented by ancient writers to support "a tendentious view of Pericles' shiftiness".[39]

Plutarch states that Cimon struck a power-sharing deal with his opponents, according to which Pericles would carry through the interior affairs and Cimon would be the leader of the Athenian army, campaigning abroad.[40] If it was actually made, this bargain would constitute a concession on Pericles' part that he was not a great strategist. Kagan believes that Cimon adapted himself to the new conditions and promoted a political marriage between Periclean liberals and Cimonian conservatives.[35]

In the mid-450s the Athenians launched an unsuccessful attempt to aid an Egyptian revolt against Persia, which led to a prolonged siege of a Persian fortress in the Nile Delta. The campaign culminated in disaster; the besieging force was defeated and destroyed.[41] In 451–450 BC the Athenians sent troops to Cyprus. Cimon defeated the Persians in the Battle of Salamis-in-Cyprus, but died of disease in 449 BC. Pericles is said to have initiated both expeditions in Egypt and Cyprus,[42] although some researchers, such as Karl Julius Beloch, argue that the dispatch of such a great fleet conforms with the spirit of Cimon's policy.[43]

Complicating the account of this period is the issue of the Peace of Callias, which allegedly ended hostilities between the Greeks and the Persians. The very existence of the treaty is hotly disputed, and its particulars and negotiation are ambiguous.[44] Ernst Badian believes that a peace between Athens and Persia was first ratified in 463 BC (making the Athenian interventions in Egypt and Cyprus violations of the peace), and renegotiated at the conclusion of the campaign in Cyprus, taking force again by 449–448 BC.[45]

John Fine, on the other hand, suggests that the first peace between Athens and Persia was concluded in 450–449 BC, due to Pericles' calculation that ongoing conflict with Persia was undermining Athens' ability to spread its influence in Greece and the Aegean.[44] Kagan believes that Pericles used Callias, a brother-in-law of Cimon, as a symbol of unity and employed him several times to negotiate important agreements.[46]

In the spring of 449 BC, Pericles proposed the Congress Decree, which led to a meeting ("Congress") of all Greek states in order to consider the question of rebuilding the temples destroyed by the Persians. The Congress failed because of Sparta's stance, but Pericles' intentions remain unclear.[47] Some historians think that he wanted to prompt a confederation with the participation of all the Greek cities; others think he wanted to assert Athenian pre-eminence.[48] According to the historian Terry Buckley the objective of the Congress Decree was a new mandate for the Delian League and for the collection of "phoros" (taxes).[49]

During the Second Sacred War Pericles led the Athenian army against Delphi and reinstated Phocis in its sovereign rights on the oracle.[51] In 447 BC Pericles engaged in his most admired excursion, the expulsion of barbarians from the Thracian peninsula of Gallipoli, in order to establish Athenian colonists in the region.[6][52] At this time, however, Athens was seriously challenged by a number of revolts among its subjects. In 447 BC the oligarchs of Thebes conspired against the democratic faction. The Athenians demanded their immediate surrender, but after the Battle of Coronea, Pericles was forced to concede the loss of Boeotia in order to recover the prisoners taken in that battle.[11] With Boeotia in hostile hands, Phocis and Locris became untenable and quickly fell under the control of hostile oligarchs.[53]

In 446 BC, a more dangerous uprising erupted. Euboea and Megara revolted. Pericles crossed over to Euboea with his troops, but was forced to return when the Spartan army invaded Attica. Through bribery and negotiations, Pericles defused the imminent threat, and the Spartans returned home.[54] When Pericles was later audited for the handling of public money, an expenditure of 10 talents was not sufficiently justified, since the official documents just referred that the money was spent for a "very serious purpose". Nonetheless, the "serious purpose" (namely the bribery) was so obvious to the auditors that they approved the expenditure without official meddling and without even investigating the mystery.[55]

After the Spartan threat had been removed, Pericles crossed back to Euboea to crush the revolt there. He then punished the landowners of Chalcis, who lost their properties. The residents of Histiaea, meanwhile, who had butchered the crew of an Athenian trireme, were uprooted and replaced by 2,000 Athenian settlers.[55] The crisis was brought to an official end by the Thirty Years' Peace (winter of 446–445 BC), in which Athens relinquished most of the possessions and interests on the Greek mainland which it had acquired since 460 BC, and both Athens and Sparta agreed not to attempt to win over the other state's allies.[53]

Final battle with the conservatives

In 444 BC, the conservative and the democratic factions confronted each other in a fierce struggle. The ambitious new leader of the conservatives, Thucydides (not to be confused with the historian of the same name), accused Pericles of profligacy, criticizing the way he spent the money for the ongoing building plan. Thucydides managed, initially, to incite the passions of the ecclesia in his favor, but, when Pericles, the leader of the democrats, took the floor, he put the conservatives in the shade. Pericles responded resolutely, proposing to reimburse the city for all the expenses from his private property, under the term that he would make the inscriptions of dedication in his own name.[56]

His stance was greeted with applause, and Thucydides suffered an unexpected defeat. In 442 BC, the Athenian public voted to ostracize Thucydides from the city for 10 years and Pericles was once again the unchallenged ruler of the Athenian political arena.[56]

Athens' rule over its alliance

Bust of Pericles after Kresilas, Altes Museum, Berlin

Pericles wanted to stabilize Athens' dominance over its alliance and to enforce its pre-eminence in Greece. The process by which the Delian League transformed into an Athenian empire is generally considered to have begun well before Pericles' time,[57] as various allies in the league chose to pay tribute to Athens instead of manning ships for the league's fleet, but the transformation was speeded and brought to its conclusion by Pericles.[58]

The final steps in the shift to empire may have been triggered by Athens' defeat in Egypt, which challenged the city's dominance in the Aegean and led to the revolt of several allies, such as Miletus and Erythrae.[59] Either because of a genuine fear for its safety after the defeat in Egypt and the revolts of the allies, or as a pretext to gain control of the League's finances, Athens transferred the treasury of the alliance from Delos to Athens in 454–453 BC.[60]

By 450–449 BC the revolts in Miletus and Erythrae were quelled and Athens restored its rule over its allies.[61] Around 447 BC Clearchus [62] proposed the Coinage Decree, which imposed Athenian silver coinage, weights and measures on all of the allies.[49] According to one of the decree's most stringent provisions, surplus from a minting operation was to go into a special fund, and anyone proposing to use it otherwise was subject to the death penalty.[63]

It was from the alliance's treasury that Pericles drew the funds necessary to enable his ambitious building plan, centered on the "Periclean Acropolis", which included the Propylaea, the Parthenon and the golden statue of Athena, sculpted by Pericles' friend, Phidias.[64] In 449 BC Pericles proposed a decree allowing the use of 9,000 talents to finance the major rebuilding program of Athenian temples.[49] Angelos Vlachos, a Greek Academician, points out the utilization of the alliance's treasury, initiated and executed by Pericles, as one of the largest embezzlements in human history; this misappropriation financed, however, some of the most marvellous artistic creations of the ancient world.[65]

Samian War

Main article: Samian War

The Samian War was one of the last significant military events before the Peloponnesian War. After Thucydides' ostracism, Pericles was re-elected yearly to the generalship, the only office he ever officially occupied, although his influence was so great as to make him the de facto ruler of the state. In 440 BC Samos went to war against Miletus over control of Priene, an ancient city of Ionia on the foot-hills of Mycale. Worsted in the war, the Milesians came to Athens to plead their case against the Samians.[66]

When the Athenians ordered the two sides to stop fighting and submit the case to arbitration in Athens, the Samians refused.[67] In response, Pericles passed a decree dispatching an expedition to Samos, "alleging against its people that, although they were ordered to break off their war against the Milesians, they were not complying".ε[›]

In a naval battle the Athenians led by Pericles and nine other generals defeated the forces of Samos and imposed on the island an Athenian administration.[67] When the Samians revolted against Athenian rule, Pericles compelled the rebels to capitulate after a tough siege of eight months, which resulted in substantial discontent among the Athenian sailors.[68] Pericles then quelled a revolt in Byzantium and, when he returned to Athens, gave a funeral oration to honor the soldiers who died in the expedition.[69]

Between 438–436 BC Pericles led Athens' fleet in Pontus and established friendly relations with the Greek cities of the region.[70] Pericles focused also on internal projects, such as the fortification of Athens (the building of the "middle wall" about 440 BC), and on the creation of new cleruchies, such as Andros, Naxos and Thurii (444 BC) as well as Amphipolis (437–436 BC).[71]

Personal attacks

Aspasia of Miletus (c. 469 BC – c. 406 BC), Pericles' companion.

Pericles and his friends were never immune from attack, as preeminence in democratic Athens was not equivalent to absolute rule.[72] Just before the eruption of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles and two of his closest associates, Phidias and his companion, Aspasia, faced a series of personal and judicial attacks.

Phidias, who had been in charge of all building projects, was first accused of embezzling gold meant for the statue of Athena and then of impiety, because, when he wrought the battle of the Amazons on the shield of Athena, he carved out a figure that suggested himself as a bald old man, and also inserted a very fine likeness of Pericles fighting with an Amazon.[73]

Aspasia, who was noted for her ability as a conversationalist and adviser, was accused of corrupting the women of Athens in order to satisfy Pericles' perversions.[74][75][76][77] The accusations against her were probably nothing more than unproven slanders, but the whole experience was very bitter for Pericles. Although Aspasia was acquitted thanks to a rare emotional outburst of Pericles, his friend, Phidias, died in prison and another friend of his, Anaxagoras, was attacked by the ecclesia for his religious beliefs.[73]

Beyond these initial prosecutions, the ecclesia attacked Pericles himself by asking him to justify his ostensible profligacy with, and maladministration of, public money.[75] According to Plutarch, Pericles was so afraid of the oncoming trial that he did not let the Athenians yield to the Lacedaemonians.[75] Beloch also believes that Pericles deliberately brought on the war to protect his political position at home.[78] Thus, at the start of the Peloponnesian War, Athens found itself in the awkward position of entrusting its future to a leader whose pre-eminence had just been seriously shaken for the first time in over a decade.[11]

Peloponnesian War

Main article: Peloponnesian War

The causes of the Peloponnesian War have been much debated, but many ancient historians lay the blame on Pericles and Athens. Plutarch seems to believe that Pericles and the Athenians incited the war, scrambling to implement their belligerent tactics "with a sort of arrogance and a love of strife".στ[›] Thucydides hints at the same thing, believing the reason for the war was Sparta's fear of Athenian power and growth. However, as he is generally regarded as an admirer of Pericles, Thucydides has been criticized for bias towards Sparta.ζ[›]

Prelude to the war

Anaxagoras and Pericles by Augustin-Louis Belle (1757–1841)

Pericles was convinced that the war against Sparta, which could not conceal its envy of Athens' pre-eminence, was inevitable if unfortunate.[79] Therefore, he did not hesitate to send troops to Corcyra to reinforce the Corcyraean fleet, which was fighting against Corinth.[80] In 433 BC the enemy fleets confronted each other at the Battle of Sybota and a year later the Athenians fought Corinthian colonists at the Battle of Potidaea; these two events contributed greatly to Corinth's lasting hatred of Athens. During the same period, Pericles proposed the Megarian Decree, which resembled a modern trade embargo. According to the provisions of the decree, Megarian merchants were excluded from the market of Athens and the ports in its empire. This ban strangled the Megarian economy and strained the fragile peace between Athens and Sparta, which was allied with Megara. According to George Cawkwell, a praelector in ancient history, with this decree Pericles breached the Thirty Years' Peace "but, perhaps, not without the semblance of an excuse".[81] The Athenians' justification was that the Megarians had cultivated the sacred land consecrated to Demeter and had given refuge to runaway slaves, a behavior which the Athenians considered to be impious.[82]

After consultations with its allies, Sparta sent a deputation to Athens demanding certain concessions, such as the immediate expulsion of the Alcmaeonidae family including Pericles and the retraction of the Megarian Decree, threatening war if the demands were not met. The obvious purpose of these proposals was the instigation of a confrontation between Pericles and the people; this event, indeed, would come about a few years later.[83] At that time, the Athenians unhesitatingly followed Pericles' instructions. In the first legendary oration Thucydides puts in his mouth, Pericles advised the Athenians not to yield to their opponents' demands, since they were militarily stronger.[84] Pericles was not prepared to make unilateral concessions, believing that "if Athens conceded on that issue, then Sparta was sure to come up with further demands".[85] Consequently, Pericles asked the Spartans to offer a quid pro quo. In exchange for retracting the Megarian Decree, the Athenians demanded from Sparta to abandon their practice of periodic expulsion of foreigners from their territory (xenelasia) and to recognize the autonomy of its allied cities, a request implying that Sparta's hegemony was also ruthless.[86] The terms were rejected by the Spartans, and with neither side willing to back down, the two cities prepared for war. According to Athanasios G. Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos, professors of strategic studies and international politics, "rather than to submit to coercive demands, Pericles chose war".[85] Another consideration that may well have influenced Pericles' stance was the concern that revolts in the empire might spread if Athens showed itself weak.[87]

First year of the war (431 BC)

The Parthenon was prompted by Pericles

In 431 BC, while peace already was precarious, Archidamus II, Sparta's king, sent a new delegation to Athens, demanding that the Athenians submit to Sparta's demands. This deputation was not allowed to enter Athens, as Pericles had already passed a resolution according to which no Spartan deputation would be welcomed if the Spartans had previously initiated any hostile military actions. The Spartan army was at this time gathered at Corinth, and, citing this as a hostile action, the Athenians refused to admit their emissaries.[88] With his last attempt at negotiation thus declined, Archidamus invaded Attica, but found no Athenians there; Pericles, aware that Sparta's strategy would be to invade and ravage Athenian territory, had previously arranged to evacuate the entire population of the region to within the walls of Athens.[89]

No definite record exists of how exactly Pericles managed to convince the residents of Attica to agree to move into the crowded urban areas. For most, the move meant abandoning their land and ancestral shrines and completely changing their lifestyle.[90] Therefore, although they agreed to leave, many rural residents were far from happy with Pericles' decision.[91] Pericles also gave his compatriots some advice on their present affairs and reassured them that, if the enemy did not plunder his farms, he would offer his property to the city. This promise was prompted by his concern that Archidamus, who was a friend of his, might pass by his estate without ravaging it, either as a gesture of friendship or as a calculated political move aimed to alienate Pericles from his constituents.[92]

In any case, seeing the pillage of their farms, the Athenians were outraged, and they soon began to indirectly express their discontent towards their leader, who many of them considered to have drawn them into the war. Even when in the face of mounting pressure, Pericles did not give in to the demands for immediate action against the enemy or revise his initial strategy. He also avoided convening the ecclesia, fearing that the populace, outraged by the unopposed ravaging of their farms, might rashly decide to challenge the vaunted Spartan army in the field.[93] As meetings of the assembly were called at the discretion of its rotating presidents, the "prytanies", Pericles had no formal control over their scheduling; rather, the respect in which Pericles was held by the prytanies was apparently sufficient to persuade them to do as he wished.[94] While the Spartan army remained in Attica, Pericles sent a fleet of 100 ships to loot the coasts of the Peloponnese and charged the cavalry to guard the ravaged farms close to the walls of the city.[95] When the enemy retired and the pillaging came to an end, Pericles proposed a decree according to which the authorities of the city should put aside 1,000 talents and 100 ships, in case Athens was attacked by naval forces. According to the most stringent provision of the decree, even proposing a different use of the money or ships would entail the penalty of death. During the autumn of 431 BC, Pericles led the Athenian forces that invaded Megara and a few months later (winter of 431–430 BC) he delivered his monumental and emotional Funeral Oration, honoring the Athenians who died for their city.[96]

Last military operations and death

In 430 BC, the army of Sparta looted Attica for a second time, but Pericles was not daunted and refused to revise his initial strategy.[98] Unwilling to engage the Spartan army in battle, he again led a naval expedition to plunder the coasts of the Peloponnese, this time taking 100 Athenian ships with him.[99] According to Plutarch, just before the sailing of the ships an eclipse of the sun frightened the crews, but Pericles used the astronomical knowledge he had acquired from Anaxagoras to calm them.[100] In the summer of the same year an epidemic broke out and devastated the Athenians.[101] The exact identity of the disease is uncertain, typhus or typhoid fever are suspected, but this has been the source of much debate.η[›] In any case, the city's plight, caused by the epidemic, triggered a new wave of public uproar, and Pericles was forced to defend himself in an emotional final speech, a rendition of which is presented by Thucydides.[102] This is considered to be a monumental oration, revealing Pericles' virtues but also his bitterness towards his compatriots' ingratitude.[11] Temporarily, he managed to tame the people's resentment and to ride out the storm, but his internal enemies' final bid to undermine him came off; they managed to deprive him of the generalship and to fine him at an amount estimated between 15 and 50 talents.[100] Ancient sources mention Cleon, a rising and dynamic protagonist of the Athenian political scene during the war, as the public prosecutor in Pericles' trial.[100]

Nevertheless, within just a year, in 429 BC, the Athenians not only forgave Pericles but also re-elected him as strategos.θ[›] He was reinstated in command of the Athenian army and led all its military operations during 429 BC, having once again under his control the levers of power.[11] In that year, however, Pericles witnessed the death of both his legitimate sons from his first wife, Paralus and Xanthippus, in the epidemic. His morale undermined, he burst into tears and not even Aspasia's companionship could console him. He himself died of the plague in the autumn of 429 BC.

Just before his death, Pericles' friends were concentrated around his bed, enumerating his virtues during peace and underscoring his nine war trophies. Pericles, though moribund, heard them and interrupted them, pointing out that they forgot to mention his fairest and greatest title to their admiration; "for", said he, "no living Athenian ever put on mourning because of me".[103] Pericles lived during the first two and a half years of the Peloponnesian War and, according to Thucydides, his death was a disaster for Athens, since his successors were inferior to him; they preferred to incite all the bad habits of the rabble and followed an unstable policy, endeavoring to be popular rather than useful.[1] With these bitter comments, Thucydides not only laments the loss of a man he admired, but he also heralds the flickering of Athens' unique glory and grandeur.

Pausanias (c. 150 C.E.) records (I.29) seeing the tomb of Pericles along a road near the Academy.

Personal life

Pericles, following Athenian custom, was first married to one of his closest relatives, with whom he had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, but around 445 BC, Pericles divorced his wife. He offered her to another husband, with the agreement of her male relatives.[105] The name of his first wife is not known; the only information about her is that she was the wife of Hipponicus, before being married to Pericles, and the mother of Callias from this first marriage.[106]

The woman whom he really adored was Aspasia of Miletus. She became Pericles' mistress and they began to live together as if they were married. This relationship aroused many reactions and even Pericles' own son, Xanthippus, who had political ambitions, did not hesitate to slander his father.[107] Nonetheless, these persecutions did not undermine Pericles' morale, although he had to burst into tears in order to protect his beloved Aspasia when she was accused of corrupting Athenian society. His greatest personal tragedy was the death of his sister and of both his legitimate sons, Xanthippus and Paralus, all affected by the epidemic, a calamity he never managed to overcome. Just before his death, the Athenians allowed a change in the law of 451 BC that made his half-Athenian son with Aspasia, Pericles the Younger, a citizen and legitimate heir,[108] a decision all the more striking in consideration that Pericles himself had proposed the law confining citizenship to those of Athenian parentage on both sides.[109]


Pericles marked a whole era and inspired conflicting judgments about his significant decisions. The fact that he was at the same time a vigorous statesman, general and orator makes more complex the objective assessment of his actions.

Political leadership

An ostracon with Pericles' name written on it (c. 444–443 BC), Museum of the ancient Agora of Athens

Some contemporary scholars call Pericles a populist, a demagogue and a hawk,[110] while other scholars admire his charismatic leadership. According to Plutarch, after assuming the leadership of Athens, "he was no longer the same man as before, nor alike submissive to the people and ready to yield and give in to the desires of the multitude as a steersman to the breezes".[111] It is told that when his political opponent, Thucydides, was asked by Sparta's king, Archidamus, whether he or Pericles was the better fighter, Thucydides answered without any hesitation that Pericles was better, because even when he was defeated, he managed to convince the audience that he had won.[11] In matters of character, Pericles was above reproach in the eyes of the ancient historians, since "he kept himself untainted by corruption, although he was not altogether indifferent to money-making".[18]

Thucydides, an admirer of Pericles, maintains that Athens was "in name a democracy but, in fact, governed by its first citizen".[1] Through this comment, the historian illustrates what he perceives as Pericles' charisma to lead, convince and, sometimes, to manipulate. Although Thucydides mentions the fining of Pericles, he does not mention the accusations against Pericles but instead focuses on Pericles' integrity.ι[›][1] On the other hand, in one of his dialogues, Plato rejects the glorification of Pericles and quote as saying: "as I know, Pericles made the Athenians slothful, garrulous and avaricious, by starting the system of public fees".[112] Plutarch mentions other criticism of Pericles' leadership: "many others say that the people were first led on by him into allotments of public lands, festival-grants, and distributions of fees for public services, thereby falling into bad habits, and becoming luxurious and wanton under the influence of his public measures, instead of frugal and self-sufficing".[20]

Thucydides argues that Pericles "was not carried away by the people, but he was the one guiding the people".[1] His judgement is not unquestioned; some 20th-century critics, such as Malcolm F. McGregor and John S. Morrison, proposed that he may have been a charismatic public face acting as an advocate on the proposals of advisors, or the people themselves.[113][114] According to King, by increasing the power of the people, the Athenians left themselves with no authoritative leader. During the Peloponnesian War, Pericles' dependence on popular support to govern was obvious.[33]

Military achievements

For more than 20 years Pericles led many expeditions, mainly naval ones. Being always cautious, he never undertook of his own accord a battle involving much uncertainty and peril and he did not accede to the "vain impulses of the citizens".[116] He based his military policy on Themistocles' principle that Athens' predominance depends on its superior naval power and believed that the Peloponnesians were near-invincible on land.[117] Pericles also tried to minimize the advantages of Sparta by rebuilding the walls of Athens, which, it has been suggested, radically altered the use of force in Greek international relations.[118]

During the Peloponnesian War, Pericles initiated a defensive "grand strategy" whose aim was the exhaustion of the enemy and the preservation of the status quo.[119] According to Platias and Koliopoulos, Athens as the strongest party did not have to beat Sparta in military terms and "chose to foil the Spartan plan for victory".[119] The two basic principles of the "Periclean Grand Strategy" were the rejection of appeasement (in accordance with which he urged the Athenians not to revoke the Megarian Decree) and the avoidance of overextension.ια[›] According to Kagan, Pericles' vehement insistence that there should be no diversionary expeditions may well have resulted from the bitter memory of the Egyptian campaign, which he had allegedly supported.[120] His strategy is said to have been "inherently unpopular", but Pericles managed to persuade the Athenian public to follow it.[121] It is for that reason that Hans Delbrück called him one of the greatest statesmen and military leaders in history.[122] Although his countrymen engaged in several aggressive actions soon after his death,[123] Platias and Koliopoulos argue that the Athenians remained true to the larger Periclean strategy of seeking to preserve, not expand, the empire, and did not depart from it until the Sicilian Expedition.[121] For his part, Ben X. de Wet concludes his strategy would have succeeded had he lived longer.[124]

Critics of Pericles' strategy, however, have been just as numerous as its supporters. A common criticism is that Pericles was always a better politician and orator than strategist.[125] Donald Kagan called the Periclean strategy "a form of wishful thinking that failed", Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober have stated that "as strategist he was a failure and deserves a share of the blame for Athens' great defeat", and Victor Davis Hanson believes that Pericles had not worked out a clear strategy for an effective offensive action that could possibly force Thebes or Sparta to stop the war.[126][127][128] Kagan criticizes the Periclean strategy on four counts: first that by rejecting minor concessions it brought about war; second, that it was unforeseen by the enemy and hence lacked credibility; third, that it was too feeble to exploit any opportunities; and fourth, that it depended on Pericles for its execution and thus was bound to be abandoned after his death.[129] Kagan estimates Pericles' expenditure on his military strategy in the Peloponnesian War to be about 2,000 talents annually, and based on this figure concludes that he would only have enough money to keep the war going for three years. He asserts that since Pericles must have known about these limitations he probably planned for a much shorter war.[130][131] Others, such as Donald W. Knight, conclude that the strategy was too defensive and would not succeed.[132]

On the other hand, Platias and Koliopoulos reject these criticisms and state that "the Athenians lost the war only when they dramatically reversed the Periclean grand strategy that explicitly disdained further conquests".[133] Hanson stresses that the Periclean strategy was not innovative, but could lead to a stagnancy in favor of Athens.[130] It is a popular conclusion that those succeeding him lacked his abilities and character.[134]

Oratorical skill

A painting by Hector Leroux (1682–1740), which portrays Pericles and Aspasia, admiring the gigantic statue of Athena in Phidias' studio

Modern commentators of Thucydides, with other modern historians and writers, take varying stances on the issue of how much of the speeches of Pericles, as given by this historian, do actually represent Pericles' own words and how much of them is free literary creation or paraphrase by Thucydides.ιβ[›] Since Pericles never wrote down or distributed his orations,ιγ[›] no historians are able to answer this with certainty; Thucydides recreated three of them from memory and, thereby, it cannot be ascertained that he did not add his own notions and thoughts.ιδ[›]

Although Pericles was a main source of his inspiration, some historians have noted that the passionate and idealistic literary style of the speeches Thucydides attributes to Pericles is completely at odds with Thucydides' own cold and analytical writing style.ιε[›] This might, however, be the result of the incorporation of the genre of rhetoric into the genre of historiography. That is to say, Thucydides could simply have used two different writing styles for two different purposes.

Ioannis Kakridis and Arnold Gomme were two scholars who debated the originality of Pericles’ oratory and last speech. Kakridis believes that Thucydides altered Pericles words. Some of his strongest arguments included in the Introduction of the speech, (Thuc.11.35).[135] Kakridis proposes that it is impossible to imagine Pericles deviating away from the expected funeral orator addressing the mourning audience of 430 after the Peloponnesian war.[135] The two groups addressed were the ones who were prepared to believe him when he praised the dead, and the ones who did not.[135] Gomme rejects Kakridis position, defending the fact that "Nobody of men has ever been so conscious of envy and its workings as the Greeks, and that the Greeks and Thucydides in particular had a passion for covering all ground in their generalizations, not always relevantly.".[135]

Kagan states that Pericles adopted "an elevated mode of speech, free from the vulgar and knavish tricks of mob-orators" and, according to Diodorus Siculus, he "excelled all his fellow citizens in skill of oratory".[136][137] According to Plutarch, he avoided using gimmicks in his speeches, unlike the passionate Demosthenes, and always spoke in a calm and tranquil manner.[138] The biographer points out, however, that the poet Ion reported that Pericles' speaking style was "a presumptuous and somewhat arrogant manner of address, and that into his haughtiness there entered a good deal of disdain and contempt for others".[138]

Gorgias, in Plato's homonymous dialogue, uses Pericles as an example of powerful oratory.[139] In Menexenus, however, Socrates (through Plato) casts aspersions on Pericles' rhetorical fame, claiming ironically that, since Pericles was educated by Aspasia, a trainer of many orators, he would be superior in rhetoric to someone educated by Antiphon.[140] He also attributes authorship of the Funeral Oration to Aspasia and attacks his contemporaries' veneration of Pericles.[141]

Sir Richard C. Jebb concludes that "unique as an Athenian statesman, Pericles must have been in two respects unique also as an Athenian orator; first, because he occupied such a position of personal ascendancy as no man before or after him attained; secondly, because his thoughts and his moral force won him such renown for eloquence as no one else ever got from Athenians".[142]

Ancient Greek writers call Pericles "Olympian" and extol his talents; referring to him "thundering and lightening and exciting Greece" and carrying the weapons of Zeus when orating.[143] According to Quintilian, Pericles would always prepare assiduously for his orations and, before going on the rostrum, he would always pray to the Gods, so as not to utter any improper word.[144]


Pericles' most visible legacy can be found in the literary and artistic works of the Golden Age, most of which survive to this day. The Acropolis, though in ruins, still stands and is a symbol of modern Athens. Paparrigopoulos wrote that these masterpieces are "sufficient to render the name of Greece immortal in our world".[125]

In politics, Victor L. Ehrenberg argues that a basic element of Pericles' legacy is Athenian imperialism, which denies true democracy and freedom to the people of all but the ruling state.[145] The promotion of such an arrogant imperialism is said to have ruined Athens.[146] Pericles and his "expansionary" policies have been at the center of arguments promoting democracy in oppressed countries.[147][148]

Other analysts maintain an Athenian humanism illustrated in the Golden Age.[149][150] The freedom of expression is regarded as the lasting legacy deriving from this period.[151] Pericles is lauded as "the ideal type of the perfect statesman in ancient Greece" and his Funeral Oration is nowadays synonymous with the struggle for participatory democracy and civic pride.[125][152]

See also


^ α: Pericles' date of birth is uncertain; he could not have been born later than 492–1 and been of age to present the Persae in 472. He is not recorded as having taken part in the Persian Wars of 480–79; some historians argue from this that he was unlikely to have been born before 498, but this argument ex silentio has also been dismissed.[23] [153]
^ β: Plutarch says "granddaughter" of Cleisthenes,[8] but this is chronologically implausible, and there is consensus that this should be "niece".[6]
^ γ: Thucydides records several speeches which he attributes to Pericles; however, he acknowledges that: "it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said."[154]
^ δ: According to Aristotle, Aristodicus of Tanagra killed Ephialtes.[155] Plutarch cites an Idomeneus as saying that Pericles killed Ephialtes, but does not believe him—he finds it to be out of character for Pericles.[40]
^ ε: According to Plutarch, it was thought that Pericles proceeded against the Samians to gratify Aspasia of Miletus.[106]
^ στ: Plutarch describes these allegations without espousing them.[73] Thucydides insists, however, that the Athenian politician was still powerful.[156] Gomme and Vlachos support Thucydides' view.[157][158]
^ ζ: Vlachos maintains that Thucydides' narration gives the impression that Athens' alliance had become an authoritarian and oppressive empire, while the historian makes no comment for Sparta's equally harsh rule. Vlachos underlines, however, that the defeat of Athens could entail a much more ruthless Spartan empire, something that did indeed happen. Hence, the historian's hinted assertion that Greek public opinion espoused Sparta's pledges of liberating Greece almost uncomplainingly seems tendentious.[159] Geoffrey Ernest Maurice de Ste Croix, for his part, argues that Athens' imperium was welcomed and valuable for the stability of democracy all over Greece.[160] According to Fornara and Samons, "any view proposing that popularity or its opposite can be inferred simply from narrow ideological considerations is superficial".[161]
^ η: Taking into consideration its symptoms, most researchers and scientists now believe that it was typhus or typhoid fever and not cholera, plague or measles.[162][163]
^ θ: Pericles held the generalship from 444 BC until 430 BC without interruption.[72]
^ ι: Vlachos criticizes the historian for this omission and maintains that Thucydides' admiration for the Athenian statesman makes him ignore not only the well-grounded accusations against him but also the mere gossips, namely the allegation that Pericles had corrupted the volatile rabble, so as to assert himself.[164]
^ ια: According to Platias and Koliopoulos, the "policy mix" of Pericles was guided by five principles: a) Balance the power of the enemy, b) Exploit competitive advantages and negate those of the enemy, c) Deter the enemy by the denial of his success and by the skillful use of retaliation, d) Erode the international power base of the enemy, e) Shape the domestic environment of the adversary to your own benefit.[165]
^ ιβ: According to Vlachos, Thucydides must have been about 30 years old when Pericles delivered his Funeral Oration and he was probably among the audience.[166]
^ ιγ: Vlachos points out that he does not know who wrote the oration, but "these were the words which should have been spoken at the end of 431 BC".[166] According to Sir Richard C. Jebb, the Thucydidean speeches of Pericles give the general ideas of Pericles with essential fidelity; it is possible, further, that they may contain recorded sayings of his "but it is certain that they cannot be taken as giving the form of the statesman's oratory".[142] John F. Dobson believes that "though the language is that of the historian, some of the thoughts may be those of the statesman".[167] C.M.J. Sicking argues that "we are hearing the voice of real Pericles", while Ioannis T. Kakridis claims that the Funeral Oration is an almost exclusive creation of Thucydides, since "the real audience does not consist of the Athenians of the beginning of the war, but of the generation of 400 BC, which suffers under the repercussions of the defeat".[168][169] Gomme disagrees with Kakridis, insisting on his belief to the reliability of Thucydides.[162]
^ ιδ: That is what Plutarch predicates.[170] Nonetheless, according to the 10th century encyclopedia Suda, Pericles constituted the first orator who systematically wrote down his orations.[171] Cicero speaks about Pericles' writings, but his remarks are not regarded as credible.[172] Most probably, other writers used his name.[173]
^ ιε: Ioannis Kalitsounakis argues that "no reader can overlook the sumptuous rythme of the Funeral Oration as a whole and the singular correlation between the impetuous emotion and the marvellous style, attributes of speech that Thucydides ascribes to no other orator but Pericles".[11] According to Harvey Ynis, Thucydides created the Pericles' indistinct rhetorical legacy that has dominated ever since.[174]


  1. Thucydides, 2.65
  2. L. de Blois, An Introduction to the Ancient World 99
  3. S. Muhlberger, Periclean Athens.
  4. S. Ruden, Lysistrata, 80.
  5. 2.37; Thucydides disclaims verbal accuracy.
  6. "Pericles". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2002.
  7. Herodotus, VI, 131.
  8. Plutarch, Pericles, III.
  9. V.L. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, a239.
  10. L. Cunningham & J. Reich, Culture and Values, 73.
  11. "Pericles". Encyclopaedia The Helios. 1952.
  12. Plutarch, Pericles, IV
  13. Plato, Alcibiades I, 118c
  14. M. Mendelson, Many Sides, 1
  15. Plutarch, Pericles, VI and Plato, Phaedrus, 270a
  16. "Pericles". Oxford Classical Dictionary. 1996.
  17. S. Hornblower, The Greek World, 479–323 BC, 33–4
  18. Plutarch, Pericles, XVI
  19. Plutarch, Pericles, VII
  20. Plutarch, Pericles, IX
  21. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 27
  22. Plutarch, Cimon, XV
  23. Fornara-Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, 24–25
  24. L.J. Samons, What's Wrong with Democracy?, 80
  25. Plutarch, Cimon, XVI
  26. Fornara-Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, 67–73
  27. R. Martin, An Overview of Classical Greek History
  28. II, 41
  29. K. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Greek Nation, Ab, 145
  30. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 24 and Politics, 1274a
  31. L.J. Samons, What's Wrong with Democracy?, 65
  32. Fine, The Ancient Greeks, 377–8
  33. J.D. King, Athenian Democracy and Empire PDF (135 KiB), 24–25
  34. D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 79
  35. D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 135–136
  36. Thucydides, 1.111
  37. P.J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World, 44
  38. Plutarch, Cimon, XVII
  39. A.J. Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, 44
  40. Plutarch, Pericles, X
  41. J. M. Libourel, The Athenian Disaster in Egypt, 605–15
  42. H. Aird, Pericles: The Rise and Fall of Athenian Democracy, 52
  43. K.J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, II, 205
  44. J. Fine, The Ancient Greeks, 359–361.
  45. E. Badian, The Peace of Callias, 1–39.
  46. D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 108.
  47. Plutarch, Pericles, XVII
  48. Wade-Grey, The Question of Tribute in 449/8 B. C., 212–29.
  49. T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC, 206.
  50. II, 64
  51. Thucydides, 1.112 and Plutarch, Pericles, XXI
  52. Plutarch, Pericles, XIX
  53. Fine, The Ancient Greeks, 368–69.
  54. Thucydides, 2.21 and Aristophanes, The Acharnians, 832
  55. Plutarch, Pericles, XXIII
  56. Plutarch, Pericles, XIV
  57. T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC, 196.
  58. H. Butler, The Story of Athens, 195
  59. D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 98
  60. T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC, 204.
  61. R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, 700–338 BC, 275.
  62. Roisman, J., Ancient Greece from Homer to Alexander: The Evidence. John Wiley & Sons, 2011, p. 26.
  63. S. Hornblower, The Greek World 479–323 BC, 120.
  64. J. M. Hurwit, The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles, 87 etc.
  65. A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 62–63.
  66. Thucydides, 1.115
  67. Plutarch, Pericles, XXV
  68. Plutarch, Pericles, XXVIII
  69. R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, 310
  70. C.J. Tuplin, Pontus and the Outside World, 28
  71. Plutarch, Pericles, XI and Plato, Gorgias, 455e
  72. Fornara-Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, 31
  73. Plutarch, Pericles, XXXI
  74. Suda, article Aspasia
  75. Plutarch, Pericles, XXXII
  76. N. Loraux, Aspasie, l'étrangère, l'intellectuelle, 133–164
  77. M. Henry, Prisoner of History, 138–139
  78. K.J. Beloch, Die Attische Politik seit Perikles, 19–22
  79. A.J. Podlecki, Perikles and his Circle, 158
  80. Thucydides, 1.31–54
  81. G. Cawkwell, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War, 33
  82. T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC, 322.
  83. Thucydides, 1.127
  84. Thucydides, 1.140–144
  85. A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 100–03.
  86. A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 20
  87. V.L. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, 264.
  88. Thucydides, 2.12
  89. Thucydides, 2.14
  90. J. Ober, The Athenian Revolution, 72–85
  91. Thucydides, 2.16
  92. Thucydides, 2.13
  93. Thucydides, 2.22
  94. D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 69
  95. Thucydides, 2.18 and Xenophon(?),Constitution of Athens, 2
  96. Thucydides, 2.35–46
  97. 2.43
  98. Thucydides, 2.55
  99. Thucydides, 2.56
  100. Plutarch, Pericles, XXXV
  101. Thucydides, 2.48 and 2.56
  102. Thucydides, 2.60–64
  103. Plutarch, Pericles, XXXVIII
  104. 2.35
  105. K. Paparrigopoulos, Aa, 221
  106. Plutarch, Pericles, XXIV
  107. Plutarch, Pericles, XXXVI
  108. Plutarch, Pericles, XXXVII
  109. W. Smith, A History of Greece, 271
  110. S. Ruden, Lysistrata , 80
  111. Plutarch, Pericles, XV
  112. Plato, Gorgias, 515e
  113. M.F. McGregor, Government in Athens, 122–23.
  114. J.S. Morrison-A. W. Gomme, Pericles Monarchos, 76–77.
  115. 2.64
  116. Plutarch, Pericles, XVIII
  117. A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 105
  118. J. Ober, National Ideology and Strategic Defence of the Population, 254
  119. A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 98–99.
  120. D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 83
  121. A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 119–120.
  122. H. Delbrück, History of the Art of War, I, 137
  123. V.L. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, 278
  124. B. X. de Wet, This So-Called Defensive Policy of Pericles, 103–19.
  125. K. Paparrigopoulos, Aa, 241–42.
  126. V.D. Hanson, Peloponnesian War, 58
  127. D. Kagan, Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War, 54
  128. S. Strauss-J. Ober, The Anatomy of Error, 47
  129. D. Kagan, The Archidamian War, 28, 41.
  130. V.D. Hanson, Peloponnesian War, 74–75
  131. D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 61–62.
  132. D. Knight, Thucydides and the War Strategy of Pericles, 150–60.
  133. A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 138
  134. L.J. Samons, What's Wrong with Democracy?, 131–32.
  135. Sicking, C. M. J. (1995). "The General Purport of Pericles' Funeral Oration and Funeral Speech". Hermes 123: 404–425.
  136. Kagan, Donald (April 2003). "The Peloponnesian War". Viking. ISBN 978-0-641-65469-5.
  137. Diodorus, XII, 39
  138. Plutarch, Pericles, V
  139. Plato, Gorgias, 455d
  140. Plato, Menexenus, 236a
  141. S. Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements, 182–186
  142. Sir Richard C. Jebb, The Attic Orators
  143. Aristophanes, Acharnians, 528–531 and Diodorus, XII, 40
  144. Quintilian, Institutiones, XII, 9
  145. V. L. Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, 332
  146. C.G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, 306
  147. V.D. Hanson, Peloponnesian War, 584
  148. L. Miller, My Favorite War
  149. E.J. Power, A Legacy of Learning, 52
  150. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies
  151. R.A. Katula, A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, 18
  152. K. Mattson, Creating a Democratic Public, 32
  153. J.K. Davies, Athenian propertied families, 600–300 BC, 457.
  154. Thucydides, 1.22
  155. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 25
  156. Thucydides, 1.139
  157. A. W. Gomme, An Historical Commentary on Thucydides, I, 452
  158. A. Vlachos, Comments on Thucydides, 141
  159. A. Vlachos, Thucydides' bias, 60 etc
  160. Ste Croix, The Character of the Athenian Empire, 1–41.
  161. Fornara-Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, 77
  162. A.W. Gomme, An Historical Commentary on Thucydides, II, 145–62.
  163. A. Vlachos, Remarks on Thucydides, 177
  164. A. Vlachos, Thucydides' bias, 62
  165. A.G. Platias-C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 104 etc.
  166. A. Vlachos, Remarks on Thucydides, 170
  167. J.F. Dobson, The Greek Orators
  168. C.M.J. Sicking, Distant Companions, 133
  169. I. Kakridis, Interpretative comments on the Funeral Oration, 6
  170. Plutarch, Pericles, VIII
  171. Suda, article Pericles
  172. Cicero, De Oratote, II, 93
  173. Quintilian, Institutiones, III, 1
  174. H. Yunis, Taming Democracy, 63


Primary sources (Greek and Roman)

  • Aristophanes, The Acharnians. See original text in Perseus program (translation)

  • Aristotle. Wikisource link to Athenian Constitution. Trans. Frederic George Kenyon. Wikisource.. See original text in Perseus program.Aristotle, Politika (Politics). See original text in Perseus program (translation)Cicero, De Oratore. See original text in Perseus program.Diodorus Siculus, Library, 12th Book. See original text in Perseus program (translation)Herodotus, The Histories, VI. See original text in Perseus program (translation)Plato, Alcibiades I. See original text in Perseus program (translation) from Plato (1955). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 8. W.R.M. Lamb (trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-99184-2.Plato, Gorgias. See original text in Perseus program, 455d, 455e, 515e (translation) from Plato (1903). Platonis Opera. John Burnet (ed.). Oxford University Press.Plato, Menexenus. See original text in Perseus program (translation) from Plato (1925). Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 9. W.R.M. Lamb (trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-99185-0.Plato, Phaedrus, See original text in Perseus program(translation) from Plato (1903). Platonis Opera. John Burnet (ed.). Oxford University Press.Plutarch, Cimon. See original text in Perseus program (translation)Plutarch. "Wikisource link to Pericles". Lives. Trans. John Dryden. Wikisource.. See original text in Perseus programQuintilian, Institutiones. See original text in The Latin Library.Thucydides. Wikisource link to History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. Richard Crawley. Wikisource., I-III. See original text in Perseus programXenophon (?), Constitution of Athens. See original text in Perseus program (translation)
  • Secondary sources

  • Aird, Hamish (2004). Pericles: The Rise and Fall of Athenian Democracy. The Rosen Publishing Group. ISBN 0-8239-3828-X.
  • Badian, E. (1987). "The Peace of Callias". "Journal of Hellenic Studies" (The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies) 107: 1–39. doi:10.2307/630067. JSTOR 630067.
  • Beloch, K.J. (1884). Die Attische Politik seit Perikles . Leipzig (in German).
  • Beloch, K.J. (1893). Griechische Geschichte. Volume II (in German).
  • Blois de, Lukas (1997). An Introduction to the Ancient World. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-12774-2.
  • Buckley, Terry (1996). Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-09957-9.
  • Butler, Howard (2005). The Story of Athens. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1-4179-7092-8.
  • Cawkwell, George (1997). Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-16552-0.
  • Cunningham L.S., Reich J.J. (2005). Culture And Values. Thomson Wadsworth. ISBN 0-534-58228-1.
  • Davis, John Kenyon (1971). Athenian propertied families, 600-300 B.C. Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-814273-0.
  • Delbrück, Hans (1920): History of the Art of War, University of Nebraska Press; Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. Volume 1.
  • Dobson, J.F. (July 1919). "Pericles as an orator". The Greek Orators. London: Methuen. Retrieved 2007-01-12.
  • Encyclopaedic Dictionary The Helios. Volume VIII. article: The Funeral Speech over the Fallen. Volume XV. article: Pericles (in Greek).
  • Ehrenberg, Victor L. (1990). From Solon to Socrates. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-04024-8.
  • Fine, John V.A. (1983). The Ancient Greeks: A critical history. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-03314-0.
  • Fornara Charles W., Loren J. Samons II (1991). Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Gomme, A. W.; A. Andrewes; K. J. Dover (1945–1981). An Historical Commentary on Thucydides (I-V). Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-814198-X.
  • Hanson, Victor Davis (2007) [English Edition 2005]. How the Athenians and Spartans fought the Peloponnesian War (translated in Greek by Angelos Philippatos). Athens: Livanis Editions. ISBN 978-960-14-1495-9.
  • Henri, Madeleine M. (1995). Prisoner of History. Aspasia of Miletus and her Biographical Tradition. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-508712-7.
  • Hornblower, Simon (2002). The Greek World 479–323 BC. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-15344-1.
  • Hurwit, Jeffrey M. (2004). The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-82040-5.
  • Just, Roger (1991). Women in Athenian Law and Life. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-05841-4.
  • Kagan, Donald (1996). "Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War". The Making of Strategy: Rules, States and Wars by Williamson Murray, Alvin Bernstein, MacGregor Knox. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-56627-4.
  • Kagan, Donald (1974). The Archidamian War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-0889-X.
  • Kagan, Donald (1989). The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-9556-3.
  • Kagan, Donald (2003). "War aims and resources (432–431)". The Peloponnesian War. Viking Penguin (Penguin Group). ISBN 0-670-03211-5.
  • Kakridis, Ioannis Th. (1993). Interpretative Comments on the Pericles' Funeral Oration. Estia (in Greek).
  • Katula, Richard A. (2003). "The Origins of Rhetoric". A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric by James J. Murphy, Richard A. Katula, Forbes I. Hill, Donovan J. Ochs. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN 1-880393-35-2.
  • King, J.D. (2005). Athenian Democracy and Empire PDF (135 KiB).
  • Knight, D.W. (1970). "Thucydides and the War Strategy of Pericles". Mnemosyne 23 (2): 150–160. doi:10.1163/156852570X00713.
  • Libourel, Jan M. (October 1971). "The Athenian Disaster in Egypt". "American Journal of Philology" (The Johns Hopkins University Press) 92 (4): 605–615. doi:10.2307/292666. JSTOR 292666.
  • Loraux, Nicole (2003). "Aspasie, l'étrangère, l'intellectuelle". La Grèce au Féminin (in French). Belles Lettres. ISBN 2-251-38048-5.
  • Mattson, Kevin (1998). Creating a Democratic Public. Penn State Press. ISBN 0-271-01723-6.
  • McGregor, Malcolm F. (1987). "Government in Athens". The Athenians and their Empire. The University of British Columbia Press. ISBN 0-7748-0269-3.
  • Mendelson, Michael (2002). Many Sides: A Protagorean Approach to the Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy of Argument. Springer. ISBN 1-4020-0402-8.
  • Miller, Laura (March 21, 2004). "My Favorite War". The Last Word (The New York Times). Retrieved 2008-06-07.
  • Monoson, Sara (2000). Plato's Democratic Entanglements. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-04366-3.
  • Morrison, J.S.; A. W. Gomme (1950). "Pericles Monarchos". Journal of Hellenic Studies (The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 70) 70: 76–77. doi:10.2307/629294. JSTOR 629294.
  • Ober, Josiah (1991). "National Ideology and Strategic Defence of the Population, from Athens to Star Wars". Hegemonic Rivalry: From Thucydides to the Nuclear Age. Westview Pr. ISBN 0-8133-7744-7.
  • Ober, Josiah (1996). The Athenian Revolution. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01095-1.
  • Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos (-Karolidis, Pavlos)(1925), History of the Hellenic Nation (Volume Ab). Eleftheroudakis (in Greek).
  • Platias Athanasios G., Koliopoulos Constantinos (2006). Thucydides on Strategy. Eurasia Publications. ISBN 960-8187-16-8.
  • "Pericles". Oxford Classical Dictionary edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth. 1996.
  • "Pericles". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2002.
  • Podlecki, A.J. (1997). Perikles and His Circle. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-06794-4.
  • Power, Edward J. (1991). A Legacy of Learning. SUNY Press. ISBN 0-7914-0610-5.
  • Rhodes, P.J. (2005). A History of the Classical Greek World. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-22564-1.
  • Ruden, Sarah (2003). Lysistrata. Hackett Publishing. ISBN 0-87220-603-3.
  • Samons, Loren J. (2004). "The Peloponnesian War". What's Wrong with Democracy?. Los Angeles, California: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-23660-2.
  • Sealey, Raphael (1976). "The Peloponnesian War". A History of the Greek City States, 700-338 B. C. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-03177-6.
  • Shrimpton, G. (1991). Theopompus The Historian. McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP. ISBN 0-7735-0837-6.
  • Sicking, CMJ (1998). Distant Companions: Selected Papers. Brill Academic Publishers. ISBN 90-04-11054-2.
  • Smith, William (1855). "Death and Character of Pericles". A History of Greece. R. B. Collins.
  • Starr, Chester G. (1991). A History of the Ancient World. Oxford University Press US. ISBN 0-19-506628-6.
  • Ste Croix de, GEM (1955–1956). The Character of the Athenian Empire. Historia III.
  • Ober Josiah, Strauss Barry S. (1990). The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists. St Martins Pr. ISBN 0-312-05051-8.
  • Tuplin, Christopher J. (2004). Pontus and the Outside World. Brill Academic Publishers. ISBN 90-04-12154-4.
  • Vlachos, Angelos (1992). Remarks on Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War (Α΄-Δ΄). Volume I. Estia (in Greek).
  • Vlachos, Angelos (1974). Thucydides' bias. Estia (in Greek).
  • Wade-Grey, H.T. (July–September 1945). "The Question of Tribute in 449/8 B. C". "Hesperia" (American School of Classical Studies at Athens) 14 (3): 212–229.
  • Wet de, B.X. (1969). "This So-Called Defensive Policy of Pericles". Acta classica 12: 103–119.
  • Yunis, Harvey (1996). Taming Democracy. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8358-1.

Further reading

  • Abbott, Evelyn (1898). Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens. G. P. Putnam's Sons.
  • Azoulay, Vincent; tr Lloyd, Janet (2014). Pericles of Athens. Princeton.
  • Brock Roger, Hodkinson Stephen (2003). Alternatives to Athens: Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-925810-4.
  • Gardner, Percy (1902). Ancient Athens.
  • Grant, Arthur James (1893). Greece in the Age of Pericles. John Murray.
  • Hesk, John (2000). Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-64322-8.
  • Kagan, Donald (1991). Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy. The Free Press. ISBN 0-684-86395-2.
  • Lummis, Douglas C. (1997). Radical Democracy. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8451-0.
  • Ober, Josiah (2001). Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-08981-7.
  • Rhodes, P.J. (2005). A History of the Classical Greek World: 478–323 BC. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-22565-X.
  • Whibley, Leonard (1889). A History of the Classical Greek World: 478–323 BC. University Press.
  • Gore Vidal, Creation (novel) for a fictional account of Pericles and a Persian view of the wars.

External links


Pericles and the Athenian democracy

Further assessments about Pericles and his era

  • Ash, Thomas. From The Delian League To The Athenian Empire
  • Jebb, R.C. The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos
  • Martin, Thomas R. An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander (Pericles' citizenship law)
  • Muhlberger, Steve. Periclean Athens
  • The Revolt of Samos (Demo Fragmentary Texts)

4  Link to Pericles biography in  A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, William Smith, Ed.

5  Links to 5th century BC and Pericles material from Thomas R. Martin's An Overview of Classical Greek History from Mycenae to Alexander.  Pages include nuerous links to primary source texts from the Perseus Digital Library and to images.

6  Pericles' Acropolis
In 447 Pericles instigated a building project in Athens1 whose scale, cost, and magnificence provoked comment and controversy in its own time and has contributed enormously in later ages to the reputation of the Golden Age of Greece. The focus of the project's construction was the Athenian acropolis.2 The acropolis (“upper city” or “city-height”) was the massive, mesa-like promontory that rose abruptly from the plain on which the city was built and towered over its center, the agora below. Here the original settlers of Athens had made their homes, and only slowly had the city expanded onto the plain at the foot of the looming citadel. A single access road, the “Sacred Way”, wound up the slope from the agora to the acropolis and passed through a gate near the top at its western end. The two most conspicuous monuments constructed on the acropolis under Pericles' program were a huge marble temple of Athena (called the Parthenon) and a mammoth gate building (called the propylaia3) straddling the western entrance to the acropolis. The purpose of the Parthenon was to house a costly new image of the goddess4, over thirty feet high and made of gold and ivory. Elaborate carved sculptures decorated the outside of the Parthenon5, which was surrounded by a colonnade of fluted columns.6 The propylaia, too, had columns, and one of its rooms apparently housed paintings7, rather like a modern museum.

1 Plut. Per. 12-13.10


Paus. 1.22.4-28.3

3 Paus. 1.22.4-7

Athens, Propylaia [Building]


5 Paus. 1.22.5-7

Athens, Parthenon [Building]


7 Paus. 1.22.4-7

7  464 BC Sparta Earthquake (See TKW note at the end of this entry)

The Sparta earthquake of 464 BC destroyed much of Sparta, a city-state of ancient Greece. Historical sources suggest that the death toll may have been as high as 20,000, although modern scholars suggest that this figure is likely an exaggeration. The earthquake sparked a revolt of the helots, the slave class of Spartan society. Events surrounding this revolt led to an increase in tension between Sparta and their rival Athens and the cancellation of a treaty between them. After the troops of a relief expedition dispatched by conservative Athenians were sent back with cold thanks, Athenian democracy itself fell into the hands of reformers and moved toward a more populist and anti-Spartan policy. Therefore, this earthquake is cited by historical sources as one of the key events that led up to the First Peloponnesian War.
  1. Effects

    Accounts of the earthquake and its consequences are based on only a few often unreliable historical sources, specifically the writings of Strabo, Pausanias, Plutarch, and Thucydides. It is difficult to judge the exact epicenter and magnitude of the earthquake, as the science of seismology had not been developed and the historical sources are few, but it has been described as 'medium to large' by historians. It likely occurred due to vertical movement on a fault by the Taygetus Mountains.[2] A 1991 study attempted to locate the fault responsible for the event and estimate the magnitude of the earthquake based on satellite imagery and fieldwork. The authors of the study conclude that if the 464 BC event took place along the fault scarp that they identify, its magnitude would have been approximately 7.2 on the surface wave magnitude scale.[3]

    Contemporary sources estimate the dead at 20,000, although modern scholars have expressed doubt about that figure, suggesting that it may be exaggerated. They question whether such a large death toll could have happened in a city which at the time was relatively small and spread out, with most buildings being one floor and constructed from wood or sun-baked brick.[4] Buildings such as these would be unlikely to result in the large casualty figures ancient sources suggest. The lack of detailed population records, coupled with flight of survivors to other areas, may have contributed to the uncertainty, as it can today.[4] In such a catastrophic quake, it is also unlikely that a number of the anecdotal tales from the time could be true, such as the Spartan king Archidamus leading the Spartan army out of the city to safety. Regardless of the exact death toll, there was some destruction, and the helots, the slave class in Spartan society, took advantage of this moment to rise in rebellion.[4]

    Historical significance

    The aftermath of the earthquake contributed to a growing distrust between Sparta and the increasingly powerful city-state of Athens. According to Thucydides, the ancient Greek chronicler of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had already decided to invade Attica when the earthquake struck. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the helots and various Messenian subjects of Sparta revolted; Sparta invoked the aid of other Greek cities to put down the rebellion, which were obliged to help in accordance with the alliance. Athens, whose aid the Spartans sought because of their "reputed experience in siege operations," sent approximately 4,000 hoplites under the leadership of Cimon, but this contingent was sent back to Athens, while those from other cities were allowed to stay. By Thucydides's account (see his History of the Peloponnesian War, I.101-102), the Spartans were concerned that the Athenians would switch sides and assist the helots; from the Spartan perspective, the Athenians had an "enterprising and revolutionary character," and by this fact alone posed a threat to the oligarchic regime of Sparta. The Athenians were insulted, and therefore repudiated their alliance with Sparta. Once the uprising was put down, some of the surviving rebels fled to Athens, which settled them at Naupactus on the strategically important Corinthian Gulf. The alliance would never be revived, as disagreements between Sparta and Athens would continue to intensify until the outbreak of war in 460 BC. Given that the Helot population seized upon the earthquake to rebel against the Spartans, they reformed their society after the Helots were gained control of again, becoming extremely austere.[5]


    1. Guidoboni E.; Ferrari G., Mariotti D., Comastri A., Tarabusi G. and Valensise G. "Catalogue of Strong Earthquakes in Italy 461 B.C. - 1997and Mediterranean area 760 B.C. - 1500". Retrieved 2009-10-19.
    2. Warner, Rex (trans.) (1954). Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Classics. ISBN 0-14-044039-9.
    3. Wilson, Nigel Guy (2006). Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece. Routledge. p. 248. ISBN 0-415-97334-1.
    4. Armijo, R., Lyon-Caen, H., and Papanastassiou, D., R.; Lyon-Caen, H.; Papanastassiou, D. (May 9, 1991). "A possible normal-fault rupture for the 464 BC Sparta earthquake" (PDF). Nature 351 (6322): 137–139. Bibcode:1991Natur.351..137A. doi:10.1038/351137a0. Retrieved 2009-10-18.
    5. Atkinson, Kathleen Mary Tyrer (1952). Ancient Sparta: A Re-examination of the Evidence. Manchester University Press. p. 352.

    1. TKW  NOTE -- Kimon was notoriously pro-Spartan, and he led the pro-Spartan calls for assistance to the Spartan in the post-earthquake Helot revolt.  Ephialtes, the leader of the Athenian populist faction argued that Sparta was the natural rival/enemy of Athens and that Athenians should rejoice at the misfortune of Sparta.  Kimon won the debate and led the 4000 Athenian Hoplites to Sparta.  When the Athenian aid was rejected, Kimon and his faction lost face and were able to be removed from Ppower in Athens.  This event was the marker for the timing of Ephialtes rise to power (with his deputy, Pericles), the begining of populist reforms, and the reversal of Athenian foreign policy -- rejection of alliance with Sparta and, conversely, alliance/cooperation with the enemies of Sparta.

8  Areopagite Constitution

The Areopagite constitution is the modern name for a period in ancient Athens described by Aristotle in his Constitution of the Athenians. According to that work, the Athenian political scene was dominated, between the ostracism of Themistocles in the late 470s BC and the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 BC, by the Areopagus, a traditional court composed of former archons.[1] Modern scholars have debated the existence of this phenomenon, with some concluding that Aristotle and his contemporaries invented it to explain Ephialtes' need to limit the Areopagus' powers,[2] and arguing that the lack of concrete measures establishing the Areopagus' dominance shows that the Areopagite constitution is "palpably unhistorical".[3] Other scholars, such as Donald Kagan, have countered that no concrete measures were necessary, as the Areopagus' dominance was established not through actual changes in the laws but through the prestige of its leading members.[4] Aristotle specifically cites the Areopagites' distribution of money to the public as the citizen body prepared to abandon Athens in the face of the advancing Persian army.[1]

The dominant political figure during this period was Cimon, the son of the famous Miltiades and a hero of the Greco-Persian Wars. To his appeal as a war hero, Cimon added the popularity he won through lavish distribution of the wealth he acquired in his campaigns;[5] Plutarch relates that he opened his lands to the public and held huge public dinners at his home.[6] Cimon pursued an aggressive policy against Persia, while working, in his position as Spartan proxenos at Athens, to secure peace and friendship between those two states.[7] According to the scholars who accept Aristotle's account, Cimon cooperated with other Athenian nobles, many of whom had been ostracized during the ascendancy of Themistocles, to undermine and eventually exile that politician.[8]

The downfall of the Areopagus, and with it Cimon, came in the late 460s BC. After an earthquake at Sparta triggered a helot rebellion, the Spartans appealed to all their allies in the Hellenic League to send them aid.[9] At Athens, a debate took place over whether to grant this request; Cimon and his supporters prevailed, and he was dispatched to the Peloponnese at the head of an army of 4,000 hoplites.[10] When the Athenian force arrived, however, the Spartans dismissed them, alone of all their allies, fearing that they might be receptive to the revolutionary ideas of the revolting helots.[9] While Cimon was gone, meanwhile, Ephialtes proposed a series of reforms in the ecclesia that sharply limited the powers of the Areopagus; these passed, and Cimon was unable to secure their repeal upon his return;[11] shortly afterwards, with his policy of friendship towards Sparta discredited and the democratic party in ascendance, he was exiled.[12] Ephialtes' reforms are considered by Aristotle and modern scholars to mark the end of the Areopagite constitution.



    1. Aristotle, Ath. Pol., 23
    2. Meiggs, Athenian Empire, 89
    3. "Areopagus", The Oxford Classical Dictionary
    4. Day and Chambers, Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy, 126
    5. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 64-65
    6. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 66
    7. Plutarch, Cimon, 10
    8. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 60
    9. Kagan, Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, 65-66
    10. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.102
    11. Plutarch, Cimon 16-17
    12. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 25